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Primary v. Secondary Labor Boycotts:
Is There a Rational Basis for the Distinction?
T HE LAW FREQUENTLY CREATES FICTIONAL CONCEPTS as a useful, if
perhaps novel, means to a proper end. In creating the concept of
the secondary labor boycott, the law has inadvertently created what
in many instances is a legal fiction which distorts the situation, often
leading to an improper and unjustifiable end. The term "secondary
labor boycott" is most frequently used in connection with Section 8
(b) (4) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, more popu-
larly called the Taft-Hartley Act.' The term "secondary labor boy-
cott" is not easily defined; indeed, that is one of the predominant
themes of this comment. Basically, it has come to mean a situation
wherein employees of Company A have a grievance against Company
A. Rather than present the grievance to Company A, the employees
decide to pressure Company B, a firm dealing with their employer,
so that Company B will pressure Company A to accede to the demands
of the latter's employees. The term has been extended, as we will see,
however, to cover any situation wherein labor organizations would
apply illegal pressures (e.g. picketing) against one firm as a means
of influencing another firm.
Before the Taft-Hartley Act
An overview on picketing
In order to gain a proper insight into the court's conceptualiza-
tion of secondary labor activity, it is necessary first to examine cur-
sorily how the courts have characterized picketing in a labor context.
After such it can be shown how concepts concerning picketing played
a part in formulating concepts concerning secondary activity.
An important early case is American Steel Foundries v. Ti-City
Central Trades Council, decided in 1921. The case involved a strike
with an employer over wages. Picketing ensued, accompanied by some
129 U.S.C. 141, et. seq. (1947).
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents -
(4) (i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any indkidual employed by any
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or
a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or other-
wise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any
services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restain any person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is:
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or
otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to
cease doing business with any other person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to
recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless
such labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under
the provisions of section 9: Provided, That Nothing contained in this clause (B) shell be
construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary
picketing:
(Continued on next page)
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violence. The district court issued an injunction. In modifying the
order, Chief Justice Taft wrote that there must be a balance between
the rights of the strikers to peacefully persuade those who would
break the strike and the protection of the rights of the individual to
choose whether to work or not, free from any coercive pressures.
The Chief Justice recognized that picketing can be carried on in a
coercive or a non-coercive way and that in issuing an inj unction, a
court of equity must make this determination based on the facts of
each case. It is interesting to note that he made no mention that such
rights emanated from the Constitution. 3 This early view can best be
stated as viewing picketing to be a form of speech as long as it was
peaceful and only persuasive. The facts of each case were to deter-
mine when picketing became more than speech.
By 1940 in the landmark case of Thornhill v. Alabama,4 the
Supreme Court considered picketing to be a form of speech protected
by the first and fourteenth amendments. In order for picketing to
be enjoined, a state was obliged to show a clear and present danger
to the life, property, or privacy of its citizens.5 "The carrying of signs
and banners, no less than the raising of a flag, is a natural and appro-
priate means of conveying information on matters of public concern."
'6
Clearly, picketing was considered a form of speech. Unlawful acts
conducted while engaging in picketing would necessarily have to be
shown before the picketing could be proscribed, and then it was more
likely that the courts would order the unlawful activity, rather than
the picketing, to cease.
The idea of picketing's being only a form of speech was short-
lived. In Hall v. Hawaiian Pineapple Co.' the district court divided
picketing into various categories, and depending upon the methods
employed, the picketing was either a lawful exercise of speech, or an
(Continued from preceding page)
Provided, That nothing contained in this subsection (b) shall be construed to make
unlawful a refusal by any person to enter upon the premises of any employer (other than
h;s own employer), if the employees of such employer are engaged in a strike ratified or
approved by a representative of such employees whom such employer is required to
recognize under this Art- Provided further, That for the purpose of this paragraph (4)
only, nothing contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other
than picketing for the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers and
members of a labor organizatios, that a product or products are produced by an employer
with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another
employer, as long as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing any individual
employed by any person other than the primary employer in the course of his employment
to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at
the establishment of the employer engaged in such distribution;.
2257 U.S. 184 (1921),
3Id. at 204-206.
4301 U.S. 88 (1940).
'Id. at 105.
'Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1940).
' 72 F.Supp. 533 (D. Hawaii 1947).
[Vol. 22:531
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unlawful activity. Where an injunction would be issued, the "unlawful
picketing" rather than just the illegal activity accompanying the
picketing could be proscribed by the state or territory.
By early 1950, Thornhill was no longer the prevailing viewpoint.
Justice Frankfurter in 1941 had fully endorsed Thornhill in American
Federation of Labor v. Swing,8 but in Hughes v. Supreme Court
of California,' a 1950 case, Frankfurter, who wrote the majority
opinion, stated that picketing was not the legal equivalent of speech.
"Picketing is not beyond the control of a state if the manner in which
picketing is conducted or the purpose which it seeks to effectuate gives
ground for its disallowance."1
In sum, the courts moved away from the position that picketing
was a form of speech, fully protected by the first and fourteenth
amendments, a view they had adopted in the early 1940's, to a position
of considering picketing as something more than speech. By the late
1940's, it was considered a form of communication having more im-
pact, more persuasive force, and more potential for coercive effect
than the spoken or printed word. As will be seen, these conceptualiza-
tions of picketing have played an important part in the court's ap-
proaches to the secondary boycott question; that is, most of the cases
that reached the Supreme Court concerning secondary activity, from
the time of the demise of the use of the Sherman Act to proscribe
secondary labor activity11 until the Taft-Hartley Act was passed, in-
8312 U.S. 321 (1941).
9 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
"Id. at 465-66.
11 29 U.S.C. §52 (1913) Statutory restrietion of injAunctive relief:
No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United States,
or a judge or the judges thereof, in any case between an employer and employees, or
between employers and employees, or between employees, or between persons employed and
persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or
conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property, or to
a property right, of the party making the application, for which injury there is no adequate
remedy at law, and such property or property right must be described with particularity in
the application, which must he in writing and sworn to by the applicant or by his agent
or attorney.
And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person or persons,
whether singly or in concert, from terminating any relation of employment, or from
ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from recommending, advising, or persuading
others by peaceful means so to do; or from attending at any place where any such person
or persons may lawfully be, for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communciating
information, or from peacefully persuading any person to work or to abstain from working;
or from ceasing to patroniae or to employ any party to such dispute, or from recommend-
ing, advising, or persuading others by peaceful and lawful means so to do; or from paying
or giving to, or withholding from, any person engaged in such dispute, any strike benefits
or other moneys or things of value; or from peaceably assembling in a lawful manner, and
fur lawful purposes; or from doing any act or thing which might lawfully be done in the
absence of such dispute by any party thereto; or shall any of the acts specified in the
paragraph be considered or held to be violations of any law of the United States. Oct. 15,
1914, c. 323, §20, 38 star. 738.
(Continued on next page)
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volved picketing.12
Developmental Periods
While the federal courts relied on Section One of the Sher-
man Act to proscribe secondary boycotts, state courts built up a shaky
body of common law holding such boycotts illegal. A typical case is
Opera on Tour v. Weber." Members of the Musicians Union pressured
plaintiff by inducing the Stagehands Union to strike the plaintiff be-
cause he would not use live musicians. The Court of Appeals of New
York declared this an illegal conspiracy. This appears to be the type
of situation the courts labeled as a secondary boycott, but the New
York Court did not approach it as such. It held that this was not a
labor dispute in that it bore no relation to wages, hours of labor, health,
safety, or right to collectively bargain. 4 As pointed out by Justice
Lehman in his lengthy dissent, the majority opinion was based on
fiction which was brought on by the court's inability to distinguish
between primary interests and secondary, unrelated interests, thus
creating the necessity for them to look for another, more artificial
basis upon which to ground their holding. He felt this "automation"
to be of primary interest, having direct bearing on both unions, and
thus felt the court had no basis to enjoin them from the exercise of
their constitutional right to strike.' 5
The courts were very troubled in their quest to protect the neu-
tral employer, while at the same time assuring the worker of what
was felt to be his fundamental right to protect and promote his self
(Continued from preceding page)
While seeming to be a wide proscription against court interference with peaceful
labor activity, this was held not applicable to secondary boycotts, which were determined
illegal as conspiracies in restraint of interstate commerce, violative of §1 of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deeting, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
After enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932, reading in part, "No court of
the United States .. .shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or
permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in a strict
conformity with provisions of this chapter..." 29 U.S.C. §101 (1932), the federal courts
have refused to hear claims that unions have violated the Sherman Act, except in such
instances where unions are acting not pursuant to a labor dispute, or in concert with
employers. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3 Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797 (1945);
see also United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
12 Building Serv. Employers Int'l. Union Local 262 v. Gaazarn, 339 U.S. 532 (1950); Hughes
v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Teamsters Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S
470 (1950); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Cafeteria
Employees Union Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943); Bakery & Pastry Drivers
& Helpers local 802 v- Wohl, 315 US. 769 (1942); Carpenters & Joiners Union of Am.
v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942); A.F. of L. v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941); Carslon
v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940). While IWohl, Ritter's Cafe and Giboaey were the only
cases involving secondary boycotts, the other cases were used by the court in formulating
secondary boycott theory. See, I.B.E.W. Local 501 v. N.L.R.B., 341 U.S. 694 (1951).
1285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E.2d 349 (1941).
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interests. In the 1917 case of Bossert v. Dhuy,16 members of the car-
penters union, while working for contractors, refused to use materials
made by non-union manufacturers. The court went to great lengths
to show how the carpenters would be affected by the material manu-
facturer's refusal to use union labor 17 and were thus justified in bring-
ing pressure upon the contractors using these materials. However, the
Court of Appeals of New York was careful not to sanction "secon-
dary" action.' What arose was the "unity of interest" concept,
grounded in the balancing of these conflicting interests.
Two United States Supreme Court cases, both decided the same
day, show the delicate balance the court had struck between the inter-
ests of the laborers and the interests of the "secondary" firms. In
Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers, Local 802 v. Wohl, 9 members of
the union had worked as delivery drivers for various bakeries. This
was during the depression, and the bakeries could no longer afford to
pay their salaries or maintain the trucks. The bakeries laid off all the
drivers and sold the trucks to those drivers who could afford them, and
then contracted with them to deliver the baked goods to retail stores.
Many of the former drivers were left without work. Many the men
who bought trucks agreed to let another man work for him one or
two days a week, but soon the truck owners could not afford to do even
this. The men without work were desperate. They appealed to their
union. The union soon found that the only way they could pressure the
truck owners into giving the men work was to peacefully picket the
bakeries so that the bakeries, not desiring adverse publicity, would
in turn pressure the truck owners into allowing the men to work.
Wohl, a truck owner, took the union to court. The district court granted
an injunction against picketing of the bakeries. The Supreme Court
reversed that order. The Court felt that the slight harm which might
come to the bakeries as a result of the peaceful picketing by the union,
which was done in order to pressure the independent delivery men to
unionize or at least use a union driver for one day per week, was too
slight an interest to outweigh the interest of the union members and
thus limit their fourteenth amendment right ".... to make known their
legitimate grievances to the public whose patronage was sustaining
the peddler system .. ."20
In the second case, Carpenter & Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe,2 1
Texas had enjoined the carpenter's union from further picketing Rit-
ter's Cafe, under the authority of a Texas anti-trust (actually anti-
16221 N.Y. 342 (1917).
17Id. at 3 56-58.
'lid. at 366.
19 315 U.S. 769 (1942).
21Id, at 775.
21 315 U.S. 722 (1942).
19731
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secondary boycott) statute. The facts were that Ritter, the cafe owner,
had contracted with Plaster, for the latter to put up a building for
him, about one mile from the cafe. Plaster used non-union labor, so
the union peacefully picketed Ritter's Cafe in order to pressure Ritter
to in turn influence Plaster to hire union labor, As a result of the picket-
ing, Ritter suffered a sixty percent loss of business, his union em-
ployees refused to work, and union employees refused to make deliv-
eries to the cafe." The five member majority, speaking through Justice
Frankfurter, said,
The law has undertaken to balance the effort of the employer
to carry on his business free from the interference of others
against the effort of labor to further its economic self-inter-
est. And every intervention of government in this struggle
has in some respect abridged the freedom of action of one or
the other or both.
23
The majority opinion concluded that the interest of Texas "... to
insulate from the dispute an establishment which industrially has no
connection with the dispute. .. 24 must prevail. Thus, the basis for the
decision is that unlike Wohl where "... . the union members would only
be following the subject matter of their dispute. .. ,-2" the union here
was harming a sufficiently unrelated firm, and thus the state's interest
in protecting such firms outweighed the union's interest, thus justify-
ing abridgement of their fourteenth amendment rights.
The four dissenters felt that the interest of the union outweighed
the state's interest in protecting the firm. They could see "no reason
why the public should be deprived of any opportunity to get informa-
tion which might enable them to use their influence to tip the scales
[one way or the other] .," Apparently, Bitter's employees and other
laborers servicing the cafe were considered part of the public. The
dissenters relied heavily on Thornhill for the proposition that a labor
dispute is a matter of public concern, and that government cannot
constitutionally regulate speech concerning such a dispute, except in
instances where there is a clear and present danger to the public
health or safety.27 They treated the issue of injury to a neutral firm
with two arguments. Citing Schneider v. State,28 the dissenters wrote:
"One is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appro-
22 Id. at 723-24.
2 Id. at 724.
'




28 308 U.S. 147 (1938).
[Vol. 22!631
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priate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some
other place,"' 9 and citing Thornhill, they stated that injury to a per-
son's business is not sufficient reason to justify curtailment of free
expression."
As was previously mentioned, the Ritter Cafe case arose in a
picketing context. It is important to note that Justice Frankfurter
wrote for the majority, "Restriction of picketing to the area of the
industry within which a labor dispute arises leaves open to the dis-
putants other traditional modes of communication."31
In sum, by the early 1940's, before abridging a labor union's right
to free speech, free assembly, and free expression, the Supreme Court
was to be very sure that harm done to the "secondary" firm greatly
outweighed any benefits to be gained by the union.
After Passage of the Taft-Hartley Act
Is it Primary or Secondary?
Early treatment
Just as the state courts had failed to do, so Congress also failed
to define where primary activity left off and secondary began. Rather,
Congress passed a broad conscription against forcing or requiring
any person to cease dealing with any other producer, manufacturer,
or processor, through direct threats, coercion, or restraints, or indi-
rect coercion through his employees. Congress also passed as broad
an exception. Primary strikes and picketing were not to be made
unlawful by §8 (b) (4)'s provisions.32 Section Two of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act,33 the "definitions" section, defines neither pri-
mary nor secondary. The federal courts (and the N.L.R.B.) were left
alone to determine this critical question.
In Douds v. Metropolitan Federation, Local 2 81,U the first case to
reach the courts under the new statute, the court was faced with a
situation wherein strikers of a primary employer picketed a "secon-
dary" firm to which their employer had subcontracted work. Judge
Rifkind refused to hold that this was an illegal secondary boycott as
the N.L.R.B. claimed. "In encouraging a strike [of the subcontractor],
the union was not extending its activity to a front remote from the
immediate dispute but to one intimately and indeed inextricably united





475 F.Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) ('The Ebasco Case").
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to it."35 The Judge cited Wohl as authority. He found that there was no
subcontractor in fact, but merely an extension of the primary firm.
He further wrote, "It must be apparent that a construction of the act
which outlaws the kind of union activity here would almost certainly
cast grave doubts upon its constitutionality." 36 Thus, again we see the
conflict between the workers' interests, and the evil of drawing neu-
trals into a conflict not of their making. But, before restricting first
amendment rights the court was to be sure the third party was in
fact neutral." The question remains: how neutral is neutral enough?
In I.B.E.W. Local 501 v. N.L.R.B.,m a union member peacefully
picketed a construction site because the electrical work was being done
by a subcontractor who did not use union labor. The carpenters, after
reading the picket sign, refused to work. The general contractor then
removed the electrical subcontractor from the job. Judge Learned
Hand concluded that this was a secondary boycott and that Congress
may forbid conduct which induces such a boycott.
Dissenting Judge Charles Clark was not willing to go along with
the majority's unsupported assessment of this as a "secondary" activ-
ity. He pointed out that a general contractor and subcontractor work
hand in hand on the same end product; and that in a situation where
a general contractor were large enough so as to do a job without
subcontracting and were to employ union labor in some departments,
but not in others, no one could dispute that the union laborers have an
economic interest and thus a right to strike. A court must examine
the economic realities of a situation before labeling activity "secon-
dary" or "primary." He pointedly wrote:
Perhaps the difficulty comes from the use of those vague
terms "primary" and "secondary," which are not terms of
either science or art or of the statute and which serve only to
confuse and to contradict. True, an avowed purpose of the act
was to prohibit "secondary" boycotts; but the implied limita-
tion of §8 (b) (4) (A), 29 U.S.C.A. §158 (b) (4) (A),3 to per-
mit "primary" boycotts in thus being properly held to include
situations where other employers are at least incidentally
affected." 40
35 id, at 677.
31 Id. at 677.
37 The ally doctrine was approved by the 2d drcuit, relying heavily on the Ebasco case, .75
F.Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), in N.L.R.B. v. Business Mach. & Office Appl. Mechanics
Conf. Bd. Local 459, 228 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1955), cert denied, 351 U.S. 962 (1956).
1 181 F.2d 34 (2d Cit. 1950), afl'd, 341 U.S. 699 (1951).
11 Since 1959, §8(b) (4) (B), 29 U.S.C.A. §158(b) (4) (B).
40 1.B.E.W. Local 501 v- N.L.R.B., 181 F.2d 34, 41 (2d Cit. 1950) (J. Clark, dissenting).
The Supreme Court was again faced with a fact situation analogous to the one in I.B.E.W.,
in the case N.L.R.B. v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951). The
(Continued on next page)
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From the opposing views of these two distinguished judges it can
be seen that the question of neutrality is actually a question of degree,
and an attempt to glibly label activity as "primary" and thus legal,
or "secondary" and thus illegal, results in situations in which the in-
terests of the opposing sides may not be properly balanced and thus
rights of free expression may be unjustifiably abridged.
More recent court treatment: loopholes in the statute, or a return
to the balance test?
In National Woodwork Association v. N.L.R.B.,1 the Supreme
Court was faced with a situation which involved a dispute between
construction workers and their contractor employer. The complaint
was brought by the Woodwork Association, representing a member
firm which dealt with the contractor. The Association argued that the
firm which was located hundreds of miles from the worksite, and
which had no contact with the workers, was being unjustly hurt by
the men's refusal to use doors finished by the firm. They claimed that
the firm was a neutral secondary party and that the workers had no
right to refuse to use the doors, even though the workers had pre-
viously done the finishing work themselves. They claimed that the
workers were pressuring their employer to stop using another firm's
products and were thus engaging in an illegal "secondary" activity
under 29 U.S.C. §158 (b) (4). The Supreme Court held that when a
firm furnishes such supplies it is no longer a "neutral" or "wholly
unconcerned" third party. The union may refuse to handle its prod-
ucts. The Supreme Court refused to abridge the labor union's right
to free expression on the basis of an off-hand categorization of such
activity as "secondary." In effect, what the Court had done was to
find that the interests of laborers who had been deprived of work
once done by them outweighed the interests of the firm that was sup-
plying that work to their employer, and thus there was no justification
for abridging the constitutional rights of the union members, even if
pressure was exerted upon the firm to stop dealing with another firm.
However, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, still wrote in
terms of "secondary" and "primary." He reasoned that since the dis-
pute was between the workers and their own employer, it was a "pri-
mary" dispute. In reading the opinion one cannot help but feel that
Court is leery about the "primary-secondary" distinction, and while
not ready to attack Congress on the distinction, was hesitant to find
(Continued from preceding page)
majority opinion reversed the D.C. Circuit's unanimous finding that the activity of the
gcneral contractor and subcontractor were so interrelated as to make union action against
the general contractor to pressure the subcontractor to hire union labor, primary activity.
JJ, Jackson, Reed, and Douglas dissented. J. Douglas' short opinion fairly echoed J. Clark's
dissent in I.B.E.W., supra.
41386 U.S. 612 (1967).
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that a labor organization was engaged in "secondary" activity unless
the complaining firm was indeed neutral, i.e., in no way involved in
the dispute.
Many firms in dealing with another firm do contract for some
service which the firms' employees could supply. It would seem now
that in disputes over the supplying of this service, the "secondary" em-
ployer may not be protected by §8 (b) (4) (B). This is a great expan-
sion upon the ally doctrine, extending it to components manufacturers.
Perhaps the largest "loophole" in §8 (b) (4) (b) found by the
Supreme Court was discovered in N.L.R.B. v. Fruit & Vegetable Pack-
ers, Local 760.42 The Court was confronted with a classic secondary
boycott fact pattern. Members of the Fruit and Vegetable Packers
Union- the "fruit pickers," were disgruntled over wages and work
conditions. Direct pressure against the apple growers, their employers,
had always been unsuccessful. They decided to picket supermarkets,
appealing to consumers not to buy apples because of their dispute with
the apple growers. Rather than holding this to be an illegal secondary
boycott, the Court, concerned that "a broad ban against peaceful
picketing might collide with the guarantees of the first amendment,"43
held that picketing of the markets, asking customers not to buy apples
supplied from the farms with whom the union had the dispute, was
not proscribed. Such activity was held to be "primary"; that is, di-
rected against the disputing apple growers, not the markets. The
retailers were not considered to be unreasonably harmed. The Court
held that as long as the picketers did not ask the public to refrain
from shopping at the markets altogether, they could continue to in-
form the shoppers of their dispute with the apple growers and appeal
to them not to purchase apples at the market. A loophole in the statute?
Or was this a careful consideration of all the facts and a weighing of
the conflicting interests resulting in a Supreme Court decision on a
delicate constitutional issue?
The reader has probably witnessed a situation similar to the
"Tree Fruits" fact pattern, if he has seen any of the lettuce boycotters
at the various supermarkets of late. A case involving them has recently
been decided by the Cuyahoga County, Ohio, Court of Appeals (8th
District). The case, C. Comella, Inc. v. U.F.W.O.C.," involved a situa-
tion where members of the United Farm Workers Union picketed a
Cleveland lettuce wholesaler, Comella, and his customers (various
supermarkets) because they refused to stop handling lettuce produced
by Bud Antle, Inc., a California firm with whom the Farm Workers
had a dispute. The defendants asked consumers not to patronize
42377 U.S. 58 (1964) (the "Tree Fruits" case).
43 Id. at 63.
4433 Ohio App. 2d 61, 292 N.E.2d 647 (1972).
[Vol. 2 2:581540
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Comella, or the supermarkets. Comella went to the Cuyahoga County,
Ohio Court of Common Pleas asking for an injunction against the
picketing. The court had jurisdiction to hear the matter because agri-
cultural workers are exempt from the Labor Management Relations
Act,4s and thus the state law was not preempted by federal statute.
The trial court labeled this as an illegal secondary labor boycott and
granted an injunction against further picketing."
On appeal, the Farm Workers claimed that their first and four-
teenth amendment rights had been improperly limited. The Court of
Appeals agreed, and modified the injunction to permit orderly picket-
ing which clearly stated that the dispute was with Bud Antle, Inc.,
and asked consumers not to purchase Antle lettuce rather than asking
the consumers not to patronize Comella or his customers. 47
It is of interest to note that Ohio has no labor code, and the de-
cision rested entirely upon common law. The court adopted the "Tree
Fruits" decision as being the common law of Ohio. Of interest is head-
note five, wherein the court stated:
A product boycott or consumer boycott (including picketing),
as defined in N.L.R.B. v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local
760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964), which is conducted at the site of a
secondary employer, is valid and lawful. Such activity is
guaranteed under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 11 of
the Ohio Constitution, but such activity must be peaceful,
educational, informational and considered part of the pri-
mary labor dispute, and may not be forceful, coercive and
directed against a secondary employer to such an extent that
it is considered a traditional secondary boycott.8
This takes on even greater significance when the court later states:
It must be determined how far the courts will go in protect-
ing the rights of a neutral secondary employer and his right
not to be intimidated and harassed, where he does not have
a labor dispute of his own. These rights must be balanced
with the rights of the union and employees to express their
grievance against the primary employer and to advise the
public concerning the grievance."4
4529 U.S.C. §152(3).
11C. Cornella, Inc. v. U.F.W.O.C., 33 Ohio App. 2d 61, 66, 292 N.E.2d 647 (1972).
471,.
81d. at 61-62, 292 N.E.2d 649.
A9Id. at 75, 292 N.E.2d 657.
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The court is obviously treating this as a question of degree: at what
point the firm's interests outweigh those of the union and employees.
The court had great difficulty in making the "primary-secondary" dis-
tinction, indeed stating that. "the line between legitimate primary
activity and banned secondary activity is not absolutely clear."5 The
court often wrote of legal secondary activity as opposed to illegal
secondary activity, thus further confusing the "primary-secondary"
distinction. In reading the opinion, one cannot help but think that if
the terms primary and secondary were deleted, there would be far
less confusion.
As has been seen, the courts have had little success in defining
the substantive evil "secondary boycotting." Circular catch phrases
such as "lack of economic interdependence," "innocent third party,"
and "disinterested neutral" have hardly provided the basis for any
meaningful tests to determine when an activity is "secondary" or "pri-
mary." At best, the courts have developed tests to determine when
certain activity is not secondary, which is rather remarkable in that
they have yet to determine exactly what secondary activity is. At the
base of this quagmire is still the critical point at which the interests of
protecting the business firm outweigh the interests of the employee.
Congress has tried to define this point as the place where labor
activity is secondary rather than primary, and as Judge Clark ad-
monished, confusion has resulted, generally without proper attention
being given to labor interests. The more recent trend of the Supreme
Court has been to more carefully scrutinize the fact situations and
weigh all the interests involved before abridging important rights
of free speech, assembly, and expression. At this time it would do well
to examine these "interests".
Defining the Interests
Congress and the courts have made it clear that their intent is to
protect the "secondary" firm. Consider what Judge Learned Hand
wrote in the Electrical Workers case: "Congress, in the search for a
compromise between the conflicting interests of employees in collective
bargaining and that of neutrals in avoiding involvements in quarrels
not their own, decided to draw a line at secondary boycotts."51 Consider
what the author of the provision, Senator Taft, had in mind: "This
provision, makes it unlawful to resort to a secondary boycott to injure
the business of a third person who is wholly unconcerned in the dis-
agreement between an employer and his employees. '52 The statute
speaks of protecting the employer from threats, coercion, or restraints,
either directly or indirectly through his employees. There is also the
interest of protecting the free flow of commerce, thus protecting the
50ld. at 75, 292 N.E.2d 657.
51 I.B.E.W. Local 501, v. N.L.R.B., 181 F.2d 34,40 (1950).
5293 CONG. REC. 4323 (June 1947).
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nation from economic harm. This would be a throwback to the doctrine
enunciated in Wickard v. Filburn"3 whereby it is felt that while the
activity of the particular individual may have a harmful effect only
locally, the activity, if not proscribed, will have a harmful interstate
effect when cumulatively participated in.
In sum, Congress desires to protect the firm from economic harm.
The question is, which firm? Distinguishing the firms to be protected
from those not to be protected by the secondary-primary distinction,
has shown itself to be an irrational exercise. Under such a distinction,
a firm which is the leading factor in a labor dispute could be pro-
tected.Y Rather than focus on this distinction, the courts have some-
times spoken in terms of preventing the "neutral" firm from being
brought into the controversy as being an important interest. This
would seem a valid purpose to the extent that the courts actually deter-
mine that a firm is indeed neutral, rather than merely equate "neutral"
to "secondary," a term in and of itself difficult to define, and clearly
not synonomous with neutrality.
Balanced against the governmental interests is the interest of the
laborer in his wages, hours, and conditions of employment, and in his
power to effectively bargain for their betterment.
Focusing on the Constitutional Question
Prior to the enactment of §8(b) (4) (B), before consideration of
the abridgement of the constitutional rights of labor organizations,
the Supreme Court would carefully weigh the abovementioned inter-
ests to determine if restrictions upon union activity were justified, as
per Ritter's Cafe,55 and Wohl.s6
The National Woodwork" and Fruit & Vegetable Packersu cases
seemed to mark a return to this careful balancing as opposed to decid-
ing cases on the "primary-secondary" distinction.
Soon after passage of the Taft-Hartley provision, this distinction
was challenged. It was claimed that abridging the union's rights to
picket on the basis of such a distinction, violated the first amendment. s9
It is of interest to note on what authority the Supreme Court decided
that §8 (b) (4) (B) 's wide proscriptions did not violate the first amend-
ment. The court writes:
s 317 U.S. Ill (1942).
5' National Woodwork Ass'u. v. N.L.R.B,, 586 U.S, 612 (1967).
55315 U.S. 722 (1942).
s315 U.S. 769 (1942).
"386 U.S. 612 (1967).
s,377 U.S. 58 (1964).
'9 I.B.E.W. Local 501 v. N.L.R.B., 341 U.S. 694 (1951). JJ. Reed, Douglas, and Jackson
dissented with no opinions.
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The substantive evil condemned by Congress in §8 (b) (4)
is the secondary boycott and we recently have recognized the
constitutional right of states to proscribe picketing in fur-
therance of comparable unlawful objectives. There is no rea-
son why Congress may not do likewiseW (emphasis added).
On what authority did the Supreme Court decide that §8 (b)
(4) (B)'s wide proscriptions did not violate the first amendment?
Cited as authority are Building Service Employees International Union
v. Gazzam1 (holding that the courts of the state of Washington did
not violate the union's first amendment rights when it enjoined the
union from further picketing plaintiff's establishment, the purpose of
such picketing being to coerce plaintiff into forcing his employees to
join the union against their wishes) ; International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. Hanke"l (holding that the courts of the state of Wash-
ington could enjoin the union from picketing plaintiff's shop, the
purpose of such picketing being to force plaintiff [who employed no
one] to join the union himself) ; Hughes v. Superior Court63 (holding
that in order to protect against de facto racial discrimination by those
who were themselves protesting alleged discrimination, California
might enjoin picketing of a store the purpose of such picketing being
to secure compliance with a demand that the store's employees be in
proportion to the racial origin of its then customers) ; and Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co.M (upholding Missouri's right to enjoin the
union from picketing plaintiff, the purpose of such picketing being to
force plaintiff to violate Missouri's criminal anti-trust laws).
The unlawful objectives in these cases are not comparable to the
secondary boycott. They are clearly definable. In Gazzam and Hanke
the governmental interest is prevention of forcing union membership
upon unwilling persons. In Hughes the interest is preventing de facto
racial discrimination. In Giboney the interest is in preventing illegal
conspiracies in restraint of trade. The Supreme Court held that these
interests were compelling enough to allow proscription of the funda-
mental right to free expression,65 at least in a peaceful picketing con-
text. It is interesting to note that in Gazzam and Hanke, while the
6ld. at 705.
61339 U.S. 532 (1950).
62 339 U.S. 470 (1950).
63339 U.S. 460 (1950).
64336 U.S. 490 (1949).
"
5 That the freedom of expression is fundamental, perhaps the most fundamental of all rights,
is well established. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Thonhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88 (1940); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Gitlow v. New York,
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court felt that the states' interest could compel a restriction on picket-
ing because the Court felt picketing involved inherent coercive aspects,
other traditional means of communication were said to be still
available.'6
In §158 Congress has in effect created two classes: those engaged
in primary activity, and those engaged in secondary activity. On the
basis of these classifications, Congress has felt it could properly limit
the labor organizations' fundamental first amendment right of free
expression, because of a compelling need to protect the firm and/or
the nation from economic harm.
For Congress to limit fundamental rights as the states did in the
foregoing cases, it is necessary to first show that the interest to be
protected is compelling.67 Is protection of the firm (and thus the
nation's economy) from economic harm a sufficiently compelling inter-
est? Consider what the Supreme Court said in Thornhill:
We hold that the danger of injury to an industrial concern
is neither so serious nor so imminent as to justify the sweep-
ing proscription of freedom of discussion . . .A
Consider further:
It does not follow that the State [Federal Government] in
dealing with the evils arising from industrial disputes may
impair the effective exercise of the right to discuss freely
industrial relations which are matters of public concern. A
contrary conclusion could be used to support abridgement of
freedom of speech and of the press concerning almost every
matter of importance to society. 9
Whether it is conclusive that economic harm to the firm can never be
used to justify government-imposed limits on peaceful expression may
be doubtful. It does weigh heavily, though, in showing that the court
felt that the harm must be very serious and imminent before the
governmental interest becomes compelling.
6"... this Court has not hesitated to uphold a states' restraint of acts and conduct which are
an abuse of the right to picket rather than a means of peaceful and truthful publicity." Build-
ing Serv. Fmployees Int'l. ocal 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 537 (1950)o "... [E]ven
though the relief afforded to Hanke and Cline entailed restriction upon communication
that the unions sought to convey through picketing, it was important to safeguard the
value which the state placed upon self-employers, leaving all other channels of communica-
tion open to the union. The relatively snall interest of the union caonsiderably influenced
the balance that was struck." Teamsters Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 477 (1950)
quoting Washington State Supreme Court decision. (emphasis added).
17See Boiling v. Sharp. 347 U.S. 497 (1954), Boiling held that concepts of substantive
equal protection are aor mutually exclusive from the concepts of due process embodied in
the fifth amendment- The court held that being subject to an invidious class distinction
(in that case, race) is a denial of one's liberty without due process. See Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
4 5Thornhill v, Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940).
1 Id. at 104.
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If it were to be conceded that the governmental interest is com-
pelling, the government still has the burden of showing that the inter-
est is being effectuated in a rational way, before the government can
limit fundamental rights."0 From what has been said previously, the
class distinction between those engaged in "primary" activity and
those engaged in "secondary" activity seems irrational. Such a dis-
tinction allows employees of one firm to legally engage in a strike and
picketing that would ruin the firm, as long as such picketing is to
promote an improvement in their wages, hours, or conditions of em-
ployment, no matter how good these benefits may currently be. Em-
ployees of another firm could be working for miserly wages and under
deplorable conditions. They are unskilled and easily replaceable. They
have no economic leverage if they act directly against their employer.
The only means they have of effectuating an improvement in their lot
is to put pressure on a second firm - which for our purposes can be
a retailer who handles their employer's product -so that the second
firm will in turn pressure the first employer to improve work condi-
tions. They decide to put a solitary picket in front of firm two's store.
The picket has no effect. No one refuses to patronize the store, work
at the store, or make a delivery to the store. Under current law [29
U.S.C. §158 (b) (4) ] this picketing is illegal even though firm two feels
no economic harm and makes no attempt to pressure firm one.
1
The statutory scheme the government has set up cannot be en-
forced in a rational way. In our examples, one class will not have its
first amendment rights limited even though not limiting them will
result in great harm to the compelling interest the government wishes
to protect. The other class will be limited in this fundamental right
even when no harm, or at best a remote chance of harm, is shown.
If it is conceded that protection of the truly neutral firms from being
forced to enter the dispute is a compelling governmental interest, the
statute is overbroad. It protects a class far greater than those firms
which are truly neutral and brought into a dispute not of their
making.7 2
Even if the classes were changed to include those participating
in a labor context as opposed to those participating in a non-labor
context, Congress has set up an irrational enforcement scheme for
protecting the firm from economic harm. Consider the following
hypotheticals and their present legal consequences.
10 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
77 See Steelworkers Local 4203 v. N.L.R.B. 294 F.2d 256 (D.C. Cir. 1961); N.L.R.B. v.
Musicians Local 802, 226 F.2d 900 (1955), for interpretations of §8(b) (4), where the
picketing had been ineffectual, holding such picketing nonetheless illegal.
"
2 See N.LR.B. v. Hatters, Cap and Millinery Intl. Union, 286 F.2d 950 (4th Cir. 1961).
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1. A group of housewives are disturbed over the recent price
increases in beef. They decide to peacefully picket a local supermarket
chain. Their picket signs ask people not to enter the stores because
of the high prices of beef. As a result, the markets lose thirty percent
of their business, twenty deliverymen refuse to make deliveries to
the markets, and fifty employees will not come to work. The market
owners, in desperation, look for another beef wholesaler who will
charge lower prices. They cut their beef prices to below cost.
2. Employees of Acme Meat Wholesalers are dismayed over their
low wages, long hours, and generally poor working conditions. Nu-
merous lengthly strikes in the past have resulted in no improvement in
conditions. Their union decides it is time to enlist public support. They
decide to send out one man, Smith, to a busy local market which deals
with Acme. Smith carries a sign asking people not to enter the market,
in order that the market will then pressure Acme into bettering the
work conditions of the union members. Smith has absolutely no effect.
No person refuses to enter the market upon seeing him. No driver
refuses to make a delivery to the market.
Can the housewives be stopped from further picketing? Can
Smith? The housewives cannot, for Congress has clearly forbidden the
courts from stopping them, in §20 of the Clayton Act.73 Smith, how-
ever can be stopped, for Congress has forbidden his activity through
the enactment of Section 8 (b) (4) of the Taft-Hartley Act.74
Altering the facts slightly, instead of carrying a sign, Smith now
hands out leaflets to the same effect. Jones, an employee of the market,
and a long-time ardent supporter of the labor movement, reads a
leaflet. He does not speak with Smith, but decides not to work for the
rest of the day. Smith is still engaged in illegal activity under 8 (b) (4).
It would seem that the interests of the union outweigh the inter-
ests of the housewives. The housewives are interested in a decrease in
cost of one item on their grocery list. The union members are interested
in their wages which enable them to purchase all grocery and non-
grocery items. The union members are also interested in their general
work conditions. The statutory scheme Congress has enacted forbids
proscribing the fundamental right of free expression of the group with
the lesser interest and causing the far greater harm, while the group
with a seemingly greater interest and causing far less harm can be
limited in their first amendment rights. Clearly the scheme Congress
has chosen, for effectuating its arguably compelling interest of pro-
tecting the firm from economic harm, is irrational.
- 29 U.S.C. §52.
74 29 U.S.C. §158 (b) (4).
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Conclusion
There is a far more innocuous way of effectuating the govern-
mental interest. The key is the harm done to the firm. This must be
weighed against the interests of the labor organization. In a labor
context, these interests would include wages, hours, work conditions,
organizational rights, and other traditional labor interests defined in
the Labor Management Relations Act. The issue then becomes, at what
point can first amendment rights be impinged upon in this quest for
these valid objectives? The answer is: at the point where the firms'
influence over the labor organization's objectives become so remote
as to no longer justify the harm that will be done to the firm; in other
words, when the firm is truly neutral as to the dispute.
Is this test as incapable of application as the primary-secondary
test has been? No. This is a balancing test, the traditional test the
courts have used for years when dealing with limitations placed on
constitutional rights. It is the same test the Supreme Court used on
March 30, 1942, the day Wohi and Ritter's Cafe were decided. The
N.L.R.B. should fare better with this test than it has to date with the
primary-secondary test of determining into which of these irrational,
hence constitutionaly invalid classes the activity under question falls.
Once a few cases have been decided using the balancing test, the
Court might at that point examine the arguable supposition under-
lying Congress' entire foray into the area, i.e., that the government's
interest in protecting even a clearly neutral firm is a compelling inter-
est. But, then, perhaps the Court might reverse the order, and if its
conclusion is that the government's interest in protecting a neutral
firm is not a compelling one, it could save itself the bother of trying
to make a thus-far unworkable law into a workable one.
Jeffrey H. Spieglert
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